The Meaning and Range of the Principle of Self-Determination by Nawaz, M. K.
THE MEANING AND RANGE OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
M. K. NAWAZ*
SEVERAIL questions have been raised in connection with the prin-
ciple of self-determination:t What is self-determination? Is it an
individual right, or that of a people? What are the circumstances
and conditions under which self-determination can be applied?
Are there any limitations governing the principle of self-determina-
tion? Answers to these questions have varied considerably, some of
them going to the extent of denying that self-determination belongs
in the province of law at all.' Such a view cannot remain unchal-
lenged in a legal inquiry. It is incorrect inasmuch as it assumes that
there is a dichotomy operating at the conceptual level. Self-determi-
nation, like other United Nations Charter concepts such as domestic
jurisdiction and aggression, belongs as much to the province of law
as of politics, and no useful purpose will be served by setting "law up
against politics, or politics against law . . . better by far 'to find
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t Concerning a bibliography on self-determination, it may be said in general that
treatises on international law contain little, if any, information. Oppenheim and
Brierly, two of the leading British authorities, make no mention of self-determination.
See BiERLY, THE LAw oF NAnONS (5th ed. 1955); OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(8th ed. 1955). As to American writers, Briggs and Bishop refer to self-determination
in their case books, but do not deal with the subject adequately. See BISHOP, INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 274 (2d ed. 1962); BRIOS, THE LAW OF NATONS 65 (1952). Continental
writers -have devoted more attention to self-determination. See, e.g., DE Visscnan,
TaEoRy AND REALITY IN PUBLic INTERNATiONAL LAW 54-80, 128-29 (1957); VERDROSS,
V6LKERREcHT 41, 226, 428 (1959). Levin has recently analyzed the Soviet doctrine of
self-determination. Levin, The Principle of Self-Determination of Nations in Inter-
national Law, SoviET YB. INT'L LAw 45 (1964).
The most important source of information concerning self-determination is, of
course, the, documents of the League of Nations and the United Nations. Higgins
has recently analyzed United Nations practice. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-
nATONAL LAw TROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNimr NATIONS 90-106 (1963).
1
"The right of self-determination has as yet found no stable place in the inter-
national legal structure nor has it been accepted by states as a policy to be applied
consistently and across the board. Indeed, I would suggest that it is essentially mis-
cast in the role of a legal right which can be made an operative part of either
domestic or international systems." EMERSON, FROM EMPIRE TO NAnON 307 (1960).
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within the limits of power the elements of common interest on the
basis of which joint action and agreed standards [can] .. .be estab-
lished.' "2 The argument also gives inadequate regard to the de-
velopments that have been taking place in the field of self-determina-
tion in the United Nations. Although this is not to imply that
the scope of the principle of self-determination can be defined
once and for all, nor that its future course can be predicted
with mathematical precision, the context in which it operates can
be set forth and the juridical aspects of the doctrine of self-determi-
nation can be outlined.
SELF-DETERMINATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically speaking, certain aspects of the principle of self-
determination are as old as the nation state.3 The best known
historical instances of self-determination are probably the American
and French Revolution. Nevertheless, international legal doctrine
was slow to recognize the juridical significance of self-determination,
notwithstanding the writings of several early French jurists.4 Wood-
row Wilson, however, effected profound changes in regard to self-de-
termination. It was probably Wilson, more than any other person,
who first contributed to a theory of self-determination. 5 Wilson never
precisely defined the principle of self-determination, but his predilec-
tions were manifested in his statement to the effect that "national
aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and
governed only by their own consent. 'Self-determination' is not a
mere phrase it is an imperative principle of action . "6 Also
relevant in this connection is the fifth of Wilson's Fourteen Points:
A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of
all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle
that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests
2HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 9 (1963).
8See generally COBBAN, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION (1944).
'An excellent summary of the views of several French writers, including Holtzen-
dorff, Bluntschli, Bonfils, Despagnet, Hall and Phillimore, will be found in WAMBAUGH,
A MONOGRAPH ON PLEBIscITEs 22-26 (1920).
5 "Nearly forty years ago a Professor of Political Science who was also President
of the United States, President Wilson, enunciated a doctrine which was .. .widely
accepted as a sensible proposition, the doctrine of self-determination." JENNINGS, THE
APPROACH TO SELF-GovERNMENT 55-56 (1956).




of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be deter-
mined.7
The essence of the Wilsonian concept of self-determination con-
sisted of the notion of self-government of peoples. Similar views
have been expressed by other commentators. "The doctrine of na-
tional self-determination," says Sarah Wambaugh, "is based on and
inseparable from that of popular sovereignty."" More recently, Kurt
Rabl has said that
viewed in historical perspective, the doctrine of the 'right of self-
determination' has evolved to mean that no people must be forced
to live under foreign domination or under a constitutional system
which it does not agree to. Every people has the right to live
within its own territory in external freedom and internal liberty.0
There is also considerable theorizing among the Communists on
the subject of self-determination. Here, of course, a doctrine of
self-determination 0 has developed which varies considerably from
the Wilsonian concept. Stalin, who is reported to have written ex-
tensively on the subject, once argued that "the right to self-determi-
nation cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the exercise by
the working class of its right to dictatorship. The former must give
way to the latter."" Since the Soviet doctrine operates within the
over-all framework of Marxist political thought, it is necessarily a
limited one.' 2
SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
As noted above, the principle of self-determination occupied an
almost pivotal position in the political philosophy of Woodrow Wil-
son.13 Wilson's contribution, however, consists not merely in his
having recognized the importance of the doctrine but also in his
7 WItuAMS, SOME AsVEcrs OF THE COVENANT oF THE LEAOUE OF NATIONS 243 (1934).
SWAMBAUGH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2.
O ABL, DAS SELBSTBESTIMMUNGSRECHT DER VOLKER 272 (1963).
2oFor an excellent account of the Bolshevik doctrine of self-determination see 1
CARR, THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917-1923, at 410-28 (1950). For a more recent
Soviet interpretation of self-determination, see Levin, The Principle of Self-Determina-
tion of Nations in International Law, SOVIET YB. INT'L LAW 45 (1963).
22 STALIN, MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTION 168 (2d ed. 1936),
quoted in COBBAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 107. See also 1 CARR, op. cit. supra note
10, at 426.
'
2 For a survey of Soviet attitudes, see Goodman, The Cry of National Liberation:
Recent Soviet Attitudes Towards National Self-Determination, 14 INT'L ORGANIZAT10N
92-106 (1960).
28 COBBAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 13.
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having taken measures to institutionalize it. Wilson once stated that
"if the desire for self-determination of any people in the world is like-
ly to affect the peace of the world or the good understanding between
nations, it becomes the business of the League . .. "14 Jessup has
pointed out that "Wilson believed an international organization was
needed to transform the doctrine of self-determination into political
reality."' For Wilson, the implementation of self-determination was
to become one of the essential functions of the League of Nations;
self-determination was to constitute an integral part of the League.16
Yet the Covenant of the League of Nations did not contain any ex-
plicit reference to self-determination. Article 3 of the original draft
of the Covenant proposed by Wilson explicitly mentioned the prin-
ciple of self-determination:
The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other
political independence and territorial integrity; but it is under-
stood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as
may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present
racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political
relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and
also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three
fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest
interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected if agreeable to
those peoples .... 17
The draft article underwent several changes at the Paris Peace Con-
ference, however, and "due to the opposition of the statesmen who
represented the British Empire," the reference to self-determination
was eliminated.'8 This is not to say, however, that there was no
reflection of the principle of self-determination in the Covenant.
Article 22 relating to mandates was a partial recognition of the
principle of self-determination. 19 The significance of article 22 was
the fact that it attacked the doctrine of sovereignty. The theory
that the State had to render an account to an international organi-
1' 2 THE PUBLIc PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, WAR AND PEAcE 244 (Baker & Dodd
eds. 1927), quoted in COBBAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 27.
25 jessup, Self-Determination Today in Principle and in Practice, 33 VIRGINIA
QUARTERLY 174, 177 (1957).
'a COBBAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 44.
'
7 LANSING, THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS-A PERSONAL NARRATIVE 93 (1921).
18 Id. at 94-95.
29"Indeed, Point 5 of the Fourteen Points, when it emphasizes the principle of
safeguarding 'the interests of the populations concerned' in the adjustment of all
colonial claims, may be taken as opening the door to something in the nature of
the Mandatory scheme." WIIIAMS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 201.
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zation, which was the quintessence of the mandate system, was cer-
tainly new to international law. Williams has said that "this is a
clear and incontrovertible assertion of the existence of something
superior to the State in human affairs."20
Several questions arose concerning the relations between sover-
eignty and the mandate system, the most intricate of which was who
was sovereign in a mandated territory. Numerous answers have been
given to this question which once plagued international lawyers21
While it may not be easy to say which of these answers is correct,
it can be said that the view that the mandatory should be regarded
as the sovereign of the territory is open to serious doubt.2 Such a
thesis would rob the mandate system of its meaning and usefulness.
Also of some significance here is the question of who is entitled
to change the status of a mandated territory. It is submitted that
if a mandatory is not the sovereign of a mandate, a fortiori it can-
not change the status of the mandated territory. "[Tlhe League of
Nations," says Quincy Wright, "seems competent and alone com-
petent to change the status of territory now under article 22.""
Furthermore, it should be noted that the disappearance of the League
of Nations in no way enlarges the poweis or authority of the manda-
tory, nor does it remove the mandatory from the category of manda-
toies.
The Case of the Aaland Islands
During the League period several problems connected with, or
bearing upon, the principle of self-determination arose, and the
League of Nations had to grapple with them, notwithstanding the
fact that the Covenant contained no reference to self-determination.
For example, in the controversy between Finland and Sweden in
1920 concerning the Aaland Islands, the International Committee
of Jurists, appointed by the Council of the League, considered the
bearing of self-determination on the relative merits of the parties. 24
20 Id. at 206.
22 See I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATiONAL LAW 222 n.5 (8th ed. 1955).
2 B ut see Rex v. Christian, 11924] So. Afr. L.R. App. Div. 101 (1923), where the
appellate division of the Supreme Court of South Africa held that the mandatory,
that is, the Union of South Africa, had sufficient internal majestas to support a
conviction of one of the inhabitants of South-West Africa for high treason. This
decision is sometimes invoked in support of the theory of sovereignty of the manda-
tory in respect of the mandate.
: WKUHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NAnIONS 506 (1930).
"For a statement of the Finnish and Swedish cases concerning the Aaland Islands,
[Vol. 1965: 82
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The Committee of Jurists, referring to self-determination, observed
that:
Although the principle of self-determination of peoples plays
an important part in modern political thought, especially since the
Great War, it must be pointed out that there is no mention of it
in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The recognition of
this principle in a certain number of international treaties can-
not be considered as sufficient to put it upon the same footing as a
positive rule of the Law of Nations.
On the contrary, in the absence of express provisions in inter-
national treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive
International Law does not recognize the right of national groups,
as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form
part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recog-
nises the right of other States to claim such a separation 2 5
This statement of the Committee of Jurists has sometimes been in-
voked in support of the thesis that self-determination has no basis
in international law. 2  There are several objections to this view.
First, this is not a complete statement of the Committee of Jurists'
exposition on self-determination. The Committee of Jurists said in
a later passage that:
Under such circumstances, [those arising in the context of revo-
lutions and wars] the principle of self-determination of peoples
may be called into play. New aspirations of certain sections of a
nation, which are sometimes based on old traditions or on a com-
mon language and civilisation, may come to the surface and pro-
duce effects which must be taken into account in the interests of
the internal and external peace of nations.
The principle recognising the rights of peoples to determine
their political fate may be applied in various ways; the most im-
portant of these are, on the one hand the formation of an inde-
pendent State, and on the other hand the right of choice between
two existing States.2 7
see LEAauE OF NAmroNs OF-. J., Special Supp. No. 1, Aug. 1920, pp. 3-24. In this
case, while Sweden invoked the principle of self-determination, Finland denied its
applicability. Sweden argued that: "There is no need to remind the Council that
when peace was being concluded endeavours were made, in tracing the frontiers of
the new States, to apply as far as possible the lofty principle of the right of self-
determination of the peoples which the Peace Conference proclaimed. This principle
is expressed with particular force in the reply of the Allied and Associated Govern-
ments to the German counter-proposals of 15th June, 1919." Id. at 22.
23 Id., Special Supp. No. 3, Oct. 1920, p. 5.
" EMERSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 303.
2
1 LEAruE oF NATiONS OFF. J., Special Supp. No. 3, Oct. 1920, p. 6.
Vol. 1965: 82)
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
This part of the committee's exposition may not warrant the con-
clusion that self-determination is a principle of international law,
but it certainly justifies the conclusion that the Committee of Jurists
recognized the significance of the principle of self-determination in
certain circumstances. Furthermore, insofar as the principle of self-
determination represents a new development in international law,
it is not fair to judge its validity on the basis of the traditional rules
of international law which it seeks- to modify. In any case, many
changes have occurred in the field of international law in general
and with regard to self-determination in particular since the exposi-
tion of the Committee of Jurists.
SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
It may be mentioned at the very outset that self-determination
occupies a far more important position in the United Nations than
it did in the League of Nations. The expression "self-determina-
tion" is explicitly mentioned in two articles of the Charter. Article
1 (2) specifies one of the purposes of the United Nations to be the
development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal
peace." Article 55, relating to international economic and social
cooperation, states that the United Nations shall promote certain
objectives "with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples . .. ."
The first question that naturally arises here is what is meant
by the concept of "self-determination" in the above articles? Second,
what is the practice of the United Nations on self-determination,
and in what way does United Nations practice clarify the meaning
and content of self-determination? Any attempt to answer these
questions must begin with an inquiry into the intentions of the
founding members of the United Nations.
Travaux Preparatoires
It is of some interest to note that the Dumbarton Oaks draft of
articles 1 (2) and 55 did not contain any reference to self-determina-
tion. The Dumbarton Oaks proposal corresponding to article 1 (2)
[Vol. 1965: 82
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was designed simply "to develop friendly relations among nations
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen international
peace." The expression "based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples" was added for the first time
at the San Francisco Conference at the instance of the four sponsor-
ing powers, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
Soviet Union.28 The sponsoring powers left no definitive record as
to what they meant by self-determination or what its meaning should
be in the context of articles 1 (2) and 55. However, the committee
which discussed the concept of self-determination had this to say:
Concerning the principle of self-determination, it was strongly
emphasized on the one side that this principle corresponded close-
ly to the will and desires of peoples everywhere and should be
dearly enunciated in the Chapter; on the other side, it was stated
that the principle conformed to the purposes of the Charter only
insofar as it implied the right of self-government of peoples and
not the right of secession 2 9
One may be tempted to say that this statement is not very helpful
in determining the meaning of self-determination of peoples in arti-
cle 1 (2). It may also be said, as, indeed, Henri Rolin of the Belgian
delegation pointed out at the San Francisco Conference, that the
usage of the terms "peoples" and "nations" in article 1 (2) is con-
fusing.30 In order to remove any possible doubts concerning the
scope of self-determination in the proposed amendment, Rolin sug-
gested the following text: "To strengthen international order on
the basis of respect for the essential rights and equality of the states,
and of the peoples' right of self-determination." 31 However, the
Belgian proposal was rejected inter alia for the following reasons:
[P]aragraph 2 has for a purpose to strengthen universal peace
and friendly relations on the basis of equality or right as stated.
The equality of states was dealt with and accepted under Chap-
28It is said that the Soviet Union initiated the move for the addition of what
subsequently became article 1 (2) containing reference to "self-determination of peo-
ples." In explaining the scope of this concept, Mr. Molotov is reported to have said
at a press conference that the Soviet Union "attached first-rate importance" to the
newly added principles of "equality and the self-determination of nations." These
goals, it was alleged, would "draw [the] particular attention of the population of
colonies and mandated territories," which would help to realize them sooner. RussFu.
& MuTsrz, A HistoRy oF Tm UNrED NA'ioNs CHARTER 810-11 (1958). See also Levin,
supra note 10.
21Doc. No. 343, 1/I/16, 6 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Docs. 296 (1945).




ter II, Principles, so it was irrelevant here to the point at issue.
[W]hat is intended by paragraph 2 is to proclaim the equal
rights of peoples as such, consequently their right to self-determi-
nation. Equality Of rights, therefore, extends in the Charter to
states, nations, and peoples.3 2
The full committee commented upon article 1 (2) as follows:
The Committee understands that the principle of equal rights
of peoples and that of self-determination are two complementary
points of one standard of conduct;
that the respect of that principle is a basis for the development of
friendly relations and is one of the measures to strengthen uni-
versal peace;
that an essential element of the principle in question is a free and
genuine expression of the will of the people....sB
A few comments may be germane here with regard to the draft-
ing history of article 1 (2). First, the concept of self-determination
embodied in article 1 (2) is distinct from the concept of equality of
states mentioned in article 2 (1). Second, the Charter concept of
self-determination is closely connected with, and bears upon, the
notion of the genuine will of the people in a given state. Beyond
this, it is not clear, however, what the intentions of the founding
members of the United Nations were with regard to self-determina-
tion in article 1 (2).
Juristic Opinion
It has been mentioned earlier that juristic opinion varies widely
on the question of the .nature of the principle of self-determination.
To some writers, recognition of the principle of self-determination
represents a new development in international law.3 4 To others it
means nothing more than the declaration of an already existing rule
of international law.3 5 Whatever the relative merits of these oppos-
82Doc. No. 725, I/I/A/19, 6 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Does. 696, 704 (1945).
SS Doc. No. 944, I/1/34 (1), 6 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Docs. 445, 455 (1945).
$'WmIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 49 (1960). Levin says
that the principle of self-determination, which expresses "the law consciousness of the
masses," has become "a primary international legal principle." Levin, supra note 10,
at 48.
5,The relevant provisions of the Charter were not creative of a new rule of law.
All they did was to confirm and lay down in writing a principle which had long
been growing and maturing in international society until it gained general recogni-
tion. By including and laying it down as one of the principles of the newly-born
organization, the Charter gave expression to one of the elements of international law




ing views, the fact remains that it is part of the United Nations
Charter and has profound legal significance to contemporary world
politics. On the question of the meaning and range of the principle,
opinions among jurists also vary. According to Kelsen, "the formula
of Article 1, paragraph 2, has the same meaning as the formula of
Article 2, paragraph 1, in which the principles of sovereignty and
equality are combined in a rather problematical way into one prin-
ciple: that of 'sovereign equality.' "31 Kelsen arrives at this conclu-
sion by interpreting the expression "self-determination of peoples"
in article 1 (.) as sovereignty of the states. With all due respect.
it is submitted that the conclusion and the reasoning leading thereto
are open to doubt. They are inconsistent with the travaux prepara-
toires, 7 and they cannot be supported by any known canon of treaty
interpretation. It could scarcely be expected that the United Na-
tions Charter, a form of treaty, would mention one and the same
concept in two articles. Consequently, the Kelsenian interpretation
affords little assistance in construing article 1 (2). Ross, however,
came very close to a correct interpretation when he wrote that self-
determination means
a right for a people or a group (in a sociologico-ethnographical
sense) to determine the national dependency of the territory in-
habited. On the positive side this would mean a right to claim
territorial changes in accordance with the wishes of the popula-
tion; on the negative side it would mean that no territory could
be ceded unless confirmed by a plebiscite.38
Ross' caveat, however, that it is "quite impossible to define by any
precise or rational criterion the group to which this right should
belong. . ... -3 has marred the soundness of his interpretation,
which, of course, is otherwise above reproach. This is neither to
say that the principle of self-determination can be smoothly applied,
nor that every demand for secession in the name of self-determina-
tion is to be considered rational.40 However, it is strongly urged
that difficulties in the application of the principle of self-determina-
tion are by no means unique to that principle alone. What is
"1 KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 53 (1950).
"* See text accompanying notes 28-33 supra.
"3 Ross, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 135 (1950).
80 Ibid.
"We have no reason to disagree with the conclusion of DeVisscher that "applied
without discernment, self-determination would lead to anarchy." DEVsscom, THEORY
AND REALITY IN PuBuc INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (1957).
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required is the devising of useful criteria for determining the ration-
ality of a demand for self-determination. Herein, as Eagleton has
pointed out, lies "a new field of international law ... being opened
up; it deserves the most serious study ... ."' Within the United
Nations it should become feasible to devise useful criteria and meth-
ods for ascertaining who the "peoples" are that are entitled to self-
determination. Consequently, the scepticism raised in some quar-
ters42 as to the implementation of the principle of self-determination
makes little sense. One may agree or disagree with a particular
determination of the United Nations, 43 for opinions can vary in this
matter as well as others. However, the fact remains that the United
Nations operates as a kind of guide and monitor of the principle
of self-determination. One must, therefore, look into various rele-
vant decisions of United Nations organs in order to ascertain the
scope of self-determination.
United Nations Practice
Perhaps it is hardly necessary to point out the value and signifi-
cance of the resolutions of the organs of the United Nations in the
development and crystallization of concepts contained in the United
Nations Charter.44 This becomes evident from an examination of
United Nations resolutions relating to the colonial question4" and
the doctrine of self-determination.
The principle of self-determination has been discussed on several
occasions in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly, as well as
in the sessions of the Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Terri-
tories Committee of the General Assembly.46 But for the most part,
,1 Eagleton, Self-Determination in the United Nations, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 88, 93
(1958).
42 "On the surface it [the principle of self-determination] seemed reasonable: let
the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until
somebody decides who are the people." JENNINGS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 56.
,"'See generally Eagleton, Excesses of Self-determination, 81 FOREIGN ArE. 592 (1958).
"4 See generally Sloan, The Binding Force of a 'Recommendation' of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, 25 BRaIT. YB. INT'L L. 1 (1948); Schachter, LAW AND
FLEXIILITY, ANN. REV. U.N. ArF. 173-86 (1952). Schachter has more recently analyzed
in detail the effect of resolutions of United Nations organs, dissenting from the view
that such resolutions have no juridical significance. Schachter, Interpretation of the
Charter in the Political Organs of the United Nations, in LAW, STATE, AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HANS KELSEN 270 (Engel ed. 1964).
"See generally Nawaz, Colonies, Self-Government, and the United Nations, 11
INDIAN YB. INT'L AFF. 3 (1962).
"See generally HIGGINS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 90-106; Eagleton, supra note 41;
Lachs, supra note 35.
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the discussions and resolutions of the General Assembly have con-
cerned what is generally known as "classical" colonialism in such cases
as Cyprus, Algeria, Indonesia, Tunis and Morocco. Despite the United
Nations' present preoccupation with "classical" colonialism, how-
ever, there are also other forms to be considered. These have come
to the fore as a result of the adoption of the now famous resolution
concerning the granting of independence to colonial territories and
peoples. 47 The resolution "solemnly proclaims the necessity of bring-
ing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms
and manifestations." The question that arises here is what forms
of colonialism are envisioned by the resolution? Although it is
difficult to answer this question decisively, it is submitted that the
resolution condemns all forms of colonialism.48
Another important aspect of the resolution is that it does not
restrict the principle of self-determination to peoples living in colo-
nies, but extends the principle to all peoples. Both the preamble
and the operative part of the resolution in effect refer to self-
determination as a principle of universal applicability. The repre-
sentative of Cyprus stated in the plenary meeting of the General
Assembly that:
Although the African-Asian draft resolution is mainly con-
cerned with the granting of independence to colonial countries
and peoples, yet it is in no way restricted. Its scope, in terms of
freedom and self-determination, is all-embracing. It includes all
peoples, in whatever land and in whatever circumstances they are
dominated and by whatever means they are deprived of their in-
alienable right to self-determination and freedom. 49
Similar views were expressed by other member states. For example,
the representative of Ecuador said that:
"TThis resolution was based upon a text proposed by forty-three Afro-Asian
member states of the United Nations. About seventy-two delegations participated in
a general debate on the resolution which lasted from November 28, 1960, to December
14, 1960. For the debates, see U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess., Plenary 981
(A/PV.925) (1960). A summary of the debates and the text of the resolution is
also published in U.N. Rlv., Jan. 1961, pp. 6-9, 37-41. This resolution was adopted
by the General Assembly without dissent. Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic,
Portugal, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States,
however, abstained from voting.
48 Mr. Tsiang of China was of the opinion that the clause applied to all types
of colonialism. He stated that: "A colony is a colony, whether it is the product of
overseas expansion or the product of overland expansion." U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc.
15th Sess., Plenary 1145 (AIPV.935) (1960).
'9 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess., Plenary 1256 (A/PV.945) (1960).
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This principle [of self-determination] must, however, be exer-
cised broadly without discrimination and without admitting ex-
clusivist subtleties or fallacious exceptions, whether from the side
of classic colonialism or of neocolonialism, and whether from the
left or the right.r0
The resolution also bears upon the question of the exercise of
sovereignty in a colonial territory. It declares that "all peoples have
an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their
sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory." What does
this signify? What freedoms are referred to? What is meant by
"integrity of their national territory"? These are all difficult ques-
tions to answer, but one can perceive the general direction in which
the winds of change are blowing. The following statement of the
Iranian representative, in the plenary meeting of the Assembly, prob-
ably serves to enlighten the meaning of this passage:
The colonial Powers must recognize that one of the first and
most important attributes of a people's independence is the exer-
cise of sovereignty, which is the sole prerogative of those living
within the national territory. Sovereignty appertains to them both
defacto and dejure and no one may exercise it on their behalf
without their freely-given consent.51
From this it would appear that sovereignty in a colonial territory
belongs to the people, and that the exercise of it should be in
accordance with the wishes of the colonial peoples.
The most important aspect of the resolution, however, consists
in its providing substance to an otherwise abstract concept of self-
determination. The resolution not only declares that all peoples
have a right of self-determination, but proclaims that "by virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development." In other
words, the concept of self-determination has more than political con-
tent; indeed, it appears as a comprehensive doctrine encompassing
economic, social and cultural factors. According to the Venezuelan
representative, the principle of self-determination includes
the right of every people to choose its own form of government, to
enjoy its spiritual and material patrimony without restriction, to
live freely in accordance with its most cherished traditions, and
11 U.N. GEN. Ass. O'F. Rzc. 15th Sess., Plenary 1101 (A/PV.933) (1960).
"1 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess., Plenary 994 (A/PV.926) (1960).
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to be exempt from any form of subjection to any other more
powerful nation or people.5 2
It purports to condemn all forms of domination. It seeks to remove
the evils of colonialism involving "political captivity, economic domi-
nation, social enslavement and cultural subjugation . ... "53
Debate in the General Assembly was also concerned with the
question of the compatibility of the resolution with the Charter.
The case of the sponsoring members was put forward by Ceylon as
follows:
After all, it does not require great intelligence or great wisdom
to see that Article 78, 76 and, what is more, Article 1, paragraph
2, of the Charter, or Article 55, are very simple matters, proposi-
tions which are accepted by the world community, and yet, in the
implementation of these Articles we find that these authorities
have not conformed to the obligations, and that is, as I say, the
justification for our draft resolution.54
Similar views were expressed by other member states. 55 In the
-interpretation of the sponsoring members, this declaration says
nothing more than what is already contained in the United Nations
Charter. It only clarifies the principle of self-determination con-
tained in the Charter.56
That self-determination is not an empty phrase, but a principle
of law which can be applied to contemporary world politics, may
be demonstrated by reference to such concrete cases as Angola and
Malaysia.
The Case of Angola
At one time Portugal argued that there was no need to apply
the principle of self-determination to Angola. 7 This argument did
12 U.N. GEN. Ass. Orr. REc. 15th Sess., Plenary 1200 (A/PV.939) (1960).
U.N. GEN. Ass. Orv. REc. 15th Sess., Plenary 1012 (A/PV.927) (1960).
5' U.N. GEN. Ass. OrF. Rxc. 15th Sess., Plenary 1002 (A/PV.926) (1960).
See the statement of the Philippines representative. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc.
15th Sess., Plenary 1103 (A/PV.933) (1960).
" The interpretation of the United States, however, was that some of the terms of
the resolution go beyond the language of the Charter. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th
Sess., Plenary 1283 (A/PV.947) (1960).
47 In its comments on the report of the Subcommittee on the Situation in Angola,
the Portuguese delegation emphasized that "there have never been demonstrations
with this purpose [viz., self-determination] in view which have had to be repressed
by the authorities." Report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese
Administration, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rae. 17th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 54,
at 82 (A/5160) (1962). In June 1961, Premier Salazar is reported to have announced
that there was no need for the expression of self-determination by the people of the
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not find favor with the United Nations, however, which declared
more than once that the principle of self-determination should ap-
ply.58 In the latest resolution on the subject, the Security Council
called upon all states to comply with a former resolution calling
upon Portugal to implement the immediate recognition of the right
of peoples of the territories under its administration to self-determi-
nation and independence. The Angolans themselves agitated for
independence. 59 The United Nations Special Committee on Terri-
tories under Portuguese Administration reported that representa-
tives of various political organizations which it had examined told
the committee thattheir organizations were dedicated to the attain-
ment of independence." The National Front for the Liberation of
Angola (FNLA) announced in 1962 that it had set up a provisional
Angolan government-in-exile in the Congo.61
There is perhaps little justification today for the argument that
the principle of self-determination does not apply to Angola. It
is of some interest to mark the recent changes in the Portuguese
position in regard to Angola. No longer does Portugal argue that
self-determination does not apply; it only maintains that the mean-
ing attributed to self-determination in the United Nations' resolu-
tions is incorrect. In this connection the precise argument of the
Portuguese foreign minister, who participated in the joint talks be-
tween Portugal and the African states, was to the effect that:
Frankly, Portugal was opposed to a certain concept of self-determi-
nation which is predetermined in its results and which ignores all
acts unless they are done in accordance with certain resolutions
or criteria. Portugal did not believe that self-determination could
be predetermined. Portugal believed that there was more than
one modality of self-determination just as there was more than one
modality with regard to the form of administration of a State.
Self-determination to Portfugal meant the agreement and consent
overseas territories for "this was done long ago and is expressed and confirmed in
the Constitution." Ibid.
58It must be mentioned here that almost all states, except Portugal, have 'come
to regard the principle of self-determination as applicable to Angola. For example,
Mr. Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that "in the
view of the United States delegation, three great principles are involved. First is
the principle of self-determination ...." 46 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 385 (1962).
g' For an account of the objectives of the political parties of the Angolans in and
outside Angola, See U.N. GEN. Ass. OFP. REc. 16th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 42 (A/4978)
(1962); U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. R.e. 17th Sess., Anhexes, Agenda Item No. 54, at 28-35
(A/5160) (1962).
:Id. at 31.
"N.Y. Times, April 6, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.
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of the population to a certain political structure, type of State and
administrative organization ...
To Portugal, self-determination meant the consent of the peo-
ple to a certain structure and political organization. It came
about by participation in administration and by participation in
political life.62
This interpretation of self-determination, however, was opposed by
the spokesmen for the African States of Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra
Leone and Tunisia, who asserted that "it was essential that the
people of the Portuguese Territories should be able to make the
important decisions as to what their present and future political
relationship with Portugal should be."6 Thus we see differences of
opinion between Portugal and the African states with regard to the
scope of self-determination. However, the fact that Portugal even
agreed to discuss the Angolan problem with the African states at
a conference table and recognized the relevance of self-determina-
tion to the Angolan problem is highly significant. It probably serves
to show the impact of the United Nations, on the one hand, and
the reality of the concept of self-determination on the other. As
to the relative merits of the arguments advanced by the interested
states on the scope of self-determination, we have already stated
that self-determination derives its content from the decisions of the
organs of the United Nations. Accordingly, Angolans have the right
to determine freely their political status and pursue their economic,
social and cultural development. This means that the Angolans can
have complete independence or any other status which the Angolans
themselves freely determine. The United Nations is there to insure
that the decisions Angolans arrive at have been arrived at volun-
tarily. Portugal surely cannot legally dictate the political future
of Angola.
The Case of Malaysia
The case of Malaysia serves as another illustration of the
application of the principle of self-determination. Not infrequently,
it is supposed that self-determination is a force for promoting seces-
sionary tendencies among national groups within states. But from
the Malaysian situation we learn that self-determination has other
"Report by the Secretary-General in Pursuance of the Resolution Adopted by the
Security Council at its 1049th Meeting on 31 July 1963 (S15380), U.N. Doc. No. S/5448,
at 4 (1963).
08 Id. at 5.
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dimensions also. In the case of Malaysia, the Secretary-General of
the United Nations was entrusted with the task of ascertaining,
prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, the wishes
of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak on the ques-
tion of the proposed federation. The Secretary-General was specifi-
cally required to insure that principle IX of resolution 1541 (XV)64
was complied with by the parties. Indonesia and the Philippines,
two of the States which opposed the formation of the federation,
stated that they would welcome Malaysia if the Secretary-General
were satisfied that there had been compliance with the resolution.
The Secretary-General accepted the task and appointed a United
Nations mission to go to the scene and ascertain the facts relating
to the consent of the people living in Sabah and Sarawak on the
issue of the federation. "The United Nations Malaysia Mission re-
ported [in 1963] ... that a great majority of the people of Sarawak
and Sabah (North Borneo) favored participation of the two terri-
tories in the proposed Federation of Malaysia." 5 The mission
adopted three different modalities for ascertaining the wishes of the
people. First, there was consultation with the legislative institutions
in the two territories. In Sarawak, the territory's highest legislative
body authorized the governor to initial the draft agreement for the
federation on behalf of Sarawak. There was similar action by the
highest legislative organ of Sabah. The second modality adopted
by the United Nations mission was that of consultation with repre-
sentatives of the people in the above territories. This consultation
disclosed, according to the mission report, that the representatives
expressed themselves in favor of the proposed Federation of Malaysia
by a margin of better than two to one. The third device employed
by the mission was to collect the opinion of the electorate in Sarawak
and Sabah on the Malaysia issue. About 61 per cent of the people of
Sarawak were found to favor Malaysia, 22.2 per cent opposed the fed-
0" Principle IX provides as follows: "Integration should have come about in the
following circumstances: (a) the integrating territory should have attained an ad-
vanced stage of self-government with free political institutions, so that its peoples
would have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and demo-
cratic processes; (b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed
wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their
status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes,
impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage. The United Nations
could, when it deems it necessary, supervise these processes." U.N. REV., Aug.-Sept.
1963, p. 12.
05 U.N. RFv., Oct. 1963, p. 11.
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eration, and 16.8 per cent remained neutral. The mission similarly
found that a great majority of the people of Sabah supported the pro-
posed Federation of Malaysia. The mission also consulted with non-
political groups and organizations, the results of which indicated that
the issue of Malaysia was widely discussed among the people at the
time of the elections, and that a majority favored the proposed fed-
eration. The mission found several motives, such as security and
economic considerations, for supporting the proposed federation.
There was also an expectation that the proposed federation would
lead to harmony among the several ethnic groups living in the
territories.
The Malaysia mission also considered the effect of political de-
tention of persons eligible to vote on the issue of federation and
concluded, in the words of the Secretary-General, that "the actual
votes of this group would not have been sufficient to have had a
material effect on the result."' 66 The Secretary-General accepted the
findings of the mission and reported to the parties to the Manila
Agreement that there was complete compliance with the principle
of self-determination within the requirements of principle IX of
resolution 1541 (XV) of the General Assembly. It is of some inter-
est to note that although principle IX is contained in a General
Assembly resolution which lists "principles which should guide Mem-
bers in determining whether or not an obligation exists to trans-
mit information called for under Article 73 (e) of the Charter," it
was applied here in a case involving the issue of self-determination
of peoples. This tends to indicate the interrelationship between
decolonization and self-determination and the usefulness of the prin-
ciples developed in the context of decolonization to the issue of
self-determination in general.
A RETROSPECT
One of the main points that emerges from the present study is
that self-determination constitutes one of the modem principles of
international law. It derives its validity principally from the Charter
of the United Nations. The Charter does not, however, define the
concept any more than it does aggression or domestic jurisdiction.
One has to look to the various resolutions of the organs of the
United Nations to ascertain its meaning and content. It is, indeed,




the body of precedents in the United Nations that enriches the
principle of self-determination.
One of the questions that has been raised in connection with the
principle of self-determination concerns the circumstances or cases
in which it can be applied. It is extremely difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to visualize the different kinds of cases in which the principle
of self-determination can be employed. This is no less true, how-
ever, with regard to other concepts referred to in the United Na-
tions Charter. What can be done is to utilize the body of precedents
developed in the United Nations in similar circumstances.
The principle of self-determination has so far been invoked only
in the context of decolonization. More specifically, it was invoked
by peoples living in colonial territories seeking self-government or
independence. Cases in point are Indonesia, Algeria, and Cyprus. In
these cases the principle operated as a force for the separa-
tion of territory from a state. But self-determination has other
dimensions also. In the case of Malaysia it was demonstrated
that self-determination can be an instrument for integration and
unification, which, of course, must be based upon the freely ex-
pressed wishes and desires of the people claiming the interest or
right in question. The resolutions of the organs of the United
Nations serve generally as guidelines in determining the nature of
the wishes of a people. In ascertaining the wishes of a people, one
can employ any modality that is best under the circumstances. The
United Nations can and should operate as the legal instrumentality
for upholding or negating the claims of self-determination of a
group of people in a particular case.
The right of self-determination extends to economic, social and
cultural matters. The fact that it has so far not been employed for
this purpose, or employed to the same degree as in the case of politi-
cal matters, does not in any way preclude its being invoked on
future occasions.
The question has also been raised as to whether the right of
self-determination belongs to an individual or to a group of people.
The cases that have come up for discussion and decision in the
United Nations would seem to suggest that the right of self-determi-
nation belongs to a collectivity rather than to an individual. Cases
in point are those involving the Aaland Islands and Malaysia. This
is not to say that self-determination cannot become an individual
(Vol. 1965: 82
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right; but so far no efforts have been made to vest in the individual
the right of self-determination. 67
The principle "of self-determination represents an important
movement away from the old legal view under which international
law rights pertain only to states and governments, and not to groups
or individuals."68 A logical corollary of this development is that
matters covered by self-determination are automatically lifted from
domaine reservd and are regulated by international law and the
United Nations. 9
07 Even the so-called Draft Covenants on Human Rights do not confer the right
of self-determination on an individual. See SOHN, BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 136 (1956).
08 HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 106 (1963).
"Old. at 103.
